07-19-2004, 02:02 PM
People's Republic of China
Uighurs fleeing persecution as China wages its "war on terror"
( view this report as PDF)
"We need to take the initiative and go on the offensive, crack down on gangs as soon as they surface and strike the first blow. We must absolutely not permit the three vicious forces to build organizations, have ringleaders, control weapons and develop an atmosphere. We need to destroy them one by one as we discover them and absolutely not allow them to build up momentum", Zhang Xiuming, deputy secretary of the XUAR committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 17 January 2004.(1)
"In Xinjiang, not one incident of explosion or assassination took place in the last few years....Last year Xinjiang's public security situation was very good..." Ismael Tiliwaldi, Chair of the XUAR government, 12 April 2004.(2)
Introduction
The following document examines recent developments in the continuing political crackdown in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People's Republic of China and the plight of members of China's mainly Muslim Uighur community fleeing human rights violations in the region.(3) Amnesty International has published a number of reports on its concerns in the region since the 1990s, including two major reports in April 1999 and March 2002.(4) Repression has continued in the region over the last two years, in the context of an ongoing political and security crackdown against the so-called "three evils" of "separatists, terrorists and religious extremists", as China continues to use "anti-terrorism" as a pretext to suppress all forms of political or religious dissent in the region.
The Chinese authorities continue to deny representatives of international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, access to China to conduct primary research. Much of the information contained in this report was obtained through sources outside China, including research conducted by Amnesty International in Turkey, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan in October 2003. These countries have sizeable Uighur populations, some of whom have arrived there recently from China. In several cases, respondents asked that their names and other identifying details be withheld as they feared for their own safety or the safety of relatives living in the XUAR.
Anyone in the XUAR found passing information to the outside world about human rights abuses is at risk of arbitrary detention, torture and other serious human rights violations. High levels of repression have severely curtailed the flow of information from the region on human rights violations over recent years.
One example is the general lack of publicly available information about death sentences and executions in the region over the last two years. Amnesty International has documented reports of such cases on a yearly basis for the whole of China, including the XUAR. Until 2002, sentences and executions were regularly being reported in the media in the XUAR - the only place in China where people were sentenced to death for political crimes.(5) Now, however, death sentences and executions are only rarely being reported in the official media in the region, apparently because the authorities have become more sensitive to concerns raised by the international community over such cases.
The first section of this report gives an overview of the human rights situation in the XUAR, including recent developments in China's official propaganda campaign against "terrorism". The second section describes the plight of Uighurs in other countries, including those who apply for asylum. According to Amnesty International's research, several disturbing trends have emerged or intensified over recent months, including harassment by the Chinese authorities of relatives of Uighurs who flee abroad; increasing attempts by the Chinese authorities to curtail the political and human rights activities of Uighur activists in other countries; and growing fears among many Uighurs abroad, including asylum seekers and refugees, of being forcibly returned to China.
Overview of the human rights situation in the XUAR
Amnesty International has been reporting on human rights violations against members of the ethnic Uighur community in the XUAR for many years. Repression of alleged "separatists" and "religious extremists" has continued since the early 1990s following the mass protests and violent riots of April 1990 in Baren township.(6) They intensified following further demonstrations and disturbances in various cities including Gulja, Khotan and Aksu in the mid-1990s and the initiation of a "strike hard" campaign against crime throughout China in 1996 which made "separatists" in the XUAR a key target (as well as in Tibet and Inner Mongolia). Reports of serious human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions, unfair trials, torture and executions, increased once again following the brutal suppression of an initially peaceful demonstration by Uighurs in the city of Gulja (Yining) in February 1997, which resulted in several days of serious unrest in the city.(7) More recently, "separatists, terrorists and religious extremists" have once again been made a key target of a renewed national "strike hard" campaign against crime which was initiated in April 2001 and which has never formally been brought to a close.
The Chinese government's use of the term "separatism" refers to a broad range of activities, many of which amount to no more than peaceful opposition or dissent, or the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of religion. Over the last three years, tens of thousands of people are reported to have been detained for investigation in the region and hundreds, possibly thousands, have been charged or sentenced under the Criminal Law; many Uighurs are believed to have been sentenced to death and executed for alleged "separatist" or "terrorist" offences, although the exact number is impossible to determine.(8)
At the same time, the government has increased restrictions on the religious rights of the Muslim population in the region, banning some religious practices during the holy month of Ramadan, closing many mosques and independent religious schools, increasing official controls over the Islamic clergy, and detaining or arresting religious leaders deemed to be "unpatriotic" or "subversive". Regional authorities have also launched political campaigns to "clean up" cultural and media circles and some government departments in Xinjiang to rid them of "undesirable elements."(9)
Human rights violations perpetrated in the XUAR are based on restrictions which apply nationwide. For example, repression of any acts which are deemed to "incite separatism" or "splittism", including acts of free expression and other non-violent activities, is underpinned by Article 103 of the Chinese Criminal Law (which may equally be applied to Tibetan or Inner Mongolian activists as to Uighur nationalists).(10) Similarly, religious practice is curtailed in China as a matter of national policy and any act of religious observance or worship outside formal, official channels may be subject to sanction, in violation of international human rights standards. The severity of restrictions imposed on any specific religion or belief system varies according to official policy, such as whether or not a particular group is the target of a political campaign. In the case of Muslims in the XUAR, religious repression has intensified during the official campaign against so-called "religious extremists," launched in recent years, with the result that controls imposed on Uighur Islam have become much harsher than on Islam among other peoples in China.(11)
Several additional factors have combined to lend a degree of severity to human rights violations in the XUAR over recent years and increased the level of discontent among the Uighur population in the region. The failure of the authorities to address grievances held by many Uighurs about serious and widespread violations of their economic, social and cultural rights remains a source of tension in the region.(12) Unemployment remains high among Uighurs and the continued influx of Han Chinese workers into the region has reportedly squeezed Uighurs further out of the labour market. The vast majority of Uighurs are farmers; they are not proficient in Chinese and have limited educational and employment opportunities. Yet, in recent years, reports indicate that Uighur families have increasingly been forced from their land by Han Chinese property developers without adequate consultation or compensation.(13) Restrictions on cultural rights have also been tightened in recent years, including the reported banning and burning of tens of thousands of Uighur books(14) and the imposition of an official policy banning Uighur as a language of instruction for most courses at Xinjiang University from September 2002.(15)
The authorities have also justified religious repression in the XUAR in terms of combating "fundamentalist" or "extremist Islamic" activities.(16) Xinjiang analysts have noted that the vast majority of Uighurs practice moderate forms of Sufi or Sunni Islam, unconnected with more radical, so-called "wahabbist" Islamic movements. Nevertheless, the spread of such beliefs in the region has reportedly increased since the 1990s with growing connections between some Uighurs and fundamentalist Islamist movements, particularly in Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.(17) The extent of religious repression, however, goes far beyond the need to combat violent activities. Amnesty International has documented numerous cases of Uighurs being detained in the XUAR in connection with their peaceful religious practices, in violation of international standards on freedom of belief and religion.(18)
Amnesty International is concerned that the high levels of repression in the XUAR are narrowing the space for any independent expression of Uighur ethnic, cultural or religious identity. Such expression, particularly when it takes the form of peaceful criticism, dissent or dissatisfaction, is often deemed by the authorities to constitute "separatist", "terrorist" or "illegal religious" activities, leading to arbitrary detention, torture and other serious human rights violations. Amnesty International continues to urge the Chinese authorities to make a clear distinction between violent acts and peaceful expression of dissent, or social, cultural or religious identity.
Uighur prisoners of conscience
The continued detention of prisoners of conscience in the XUAR is evidence that China's policies of repression in the region stretch far beyond concerns with combating acts of violence or "terrorism". Given official restrictions on access and information, the total number of those detained solely for engaging in peaceful acts of freedom of expression, association or other rights in the region is impossible to determine. Many of those falling within this category are believed to be held without charge or trial in "re-education through labour" camps or other places of detention. However, the two individuals, whose cases are described below, received long prison sentences and continue to be imprisoned, despite repeated calls for their release from other governments, human rights mechanisms of the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations, including Amnesty International.
Rebiya Kadeer, aged 57 and a mother of eleven was sentenced in a secret trial in March 2000 to eight years' imprisonment by the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court on charges of "providing secret information to foreigners" under Article 111 of the Chinese criminal law.(19) During the trial neither Rebiya Kadeer nor her lawyer were allowed to speak in her defence. The verdict of her trial describes the "secret information" as copies of the publicly available newspapers, Kashgar Daily, Xinjiang Legal News, Yili Daily and Yili Evening News, that she sent to her husband - a former political prisoner from the XUAR who has lived in the USA since 1996. Her appeal was rejected in November 2000, and the verdict was confirmed.
Rebiya Kadeer had travelled to the USA together with her husband in 1996, but she later returned to the XUAR. In 1997, the Chinese authorities placed her under surveillance and confiscated her passport. According to Wang Lequan, the secretary of the regional Communist Party Committee, this was reportedly because "her husband was engaged in subverting the government and separatist activities outside the country".(20) This appeared to refer to his activities as a broadcaster with the radio stations, Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA).
Rebiya Kadeer was detained in August 1999 on her way to meet a member of a United States Congressional Research delegation which was visiting China at the time. She was accused of having in her possession a list of ten people "suspected of having a connection with national separatist activists." Her family was not allowed to visit her for the first 15 months of her detention, and since then family visits have been restricted and closely monitored by the prison officials. On some occasions family visits have been cancelled, often at short notice. She is currently being held at Urumqi Women's Prison and reportedly suffers from chronic gastritis and occasional high blood pressure. She is on daily medication.
At the time of Rebiya Kadeer's detention in August 1999, her son Ablikim Abdurehim and her secretary Kahriman Abdukirim were also detained and sentenced without charge or trial to two and three years' "re-education through labour" terms respectively. Both were reportedly ill-treated in detention. In December 2002, four of Rebiya Kadeer's children living in the XUAR were briefly detained, apparently to prevent them from meeting with a senior US official visiting the region.
Rebiya Kadeer's sentence was reduced by one year in March 2004, reportedly because she had "recognised her mistakes and was resolved to stand on the side of the Party and people".(21) She is now due for release on 12 August 2006. According to reports, the Chinese authorities may consider further sentence reductions if Rebiya Kadeer continues to demonstrate "genuine repentance and willingness to reform."(22)
Rebiya Kadeer was once celebrated as a model Uighur businesswoman, and in 1995 her success won her a place in China's official delegation to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. In 1997 she was involved in creating the "Thousand Mothers Movement" - a forum promoting the rights of ethnic minority women, and creating employment opportunities for them. The forum was launched in Rebiya Kadeer's department store in Urumqi, and at a second meeting of the "Thousand Mothers Movement", she spoke about the power of women and her desire to help Uighur mothers, many of whom wished to work to help sustain their families, but had no opportunity to do so. Rebiya Kadeer had also been an official member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a broad-based official body which includes representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, other official political parties, mass organizations and other key figures. In 1998, however, she was banned from re-election to the CPPCC, ostensibly because she had "failed" to condemn her husband's "separatist" activities in the USA.
Amnesty International welcomes the recent reduction in her prison sentence, but remains deeply concerned at Rebiya Kadeer's continued imprisonment in violation of her fundamental human rights to freedom of expression and association. The organization considers her to be a prisoner of conscience and reiterates its calls for her immediate and unconditional release.
Tohti Tunyaz, an ethnic Uighur historian aged 44, has now served six years of his 11-year sentence on charges of "illegally acquiring state secrets" and "inciting separatism" under Articles 111 and 103 of the Criminal Law. He is being held in the XUAR No.3 Prison in Urumqi.
Before his arrest in China on 11 February 1998, Tohti Tunyaz was a postgraduate student at the University of Tokyo in Japan. He was specializing in China's policy towards ethnic minorities, and had travelled home to the XUAR to collect material for his thesis on the region's history before the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, in particular the period of the East Turkestan Republic between 1944-49. He was arrested during this visit and convicted in March 1999 by the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court. His sentence was later confirmed on appeal. He is due for release in February 2009.
The charge of "illegally acquiring state secrets" referred to a list of 50-year-old documents Tohti Tunyaz obtained with the help of an official librarian in the XUAR. During his trial, the charge of "inciting separatism" was linked with a book entitled "The Inside Story of the Silk Road" that the Chinese authorities claimed Tohti Tunyaz had published in Japan. However, according to his professor, he had not published such a book, or any book that "incites separatism".
Tohti Tunyaz writes under the pen-name Tohti Muzart, which refers to a river in Baicheng County in Aksu Prefecture of the XUAR, where he was raised. In 2002 PEN American Center honoured Tohti Tunyaz with the PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award. His family lives in Japan.
In May 2001, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) adopted an opinion on Tohti Tunyaz's case which stated that the deprivation of liberty of Tohti Tunyaz was arbitrary and contravened several of the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including rights to freedom of thought, opinion and expression. The WGAD also emphasized that:
"Mr Tohti Tunyaz cannot be sentenced merely for writing a research paper, which, even if it were published, lay within his right to exercise the freedoms of thought, expression and opinion which are enjoyed by everyone and which can by no means be regarded as reprehensible if exercised through peaceful means, as they were in this case."(23)
To date, the Chinese authorities have failed to comply with WGAD's ruling to "remedy the situation" and Tohti Tunyaz remains in prison. Amnesty International considers him to be a prisoner of conscience and continues to call for his immediate and unconditional release.
Estimates of arrests and sentences since March 2002
The Chinese authorities continue to withhold publication of detailed statistics about the detention and imprisonment of individuals across the country. China also continues to prevent access for international human rights organizations to conduct independent research on such issues.
In addition, growing levels of repression in the context of China's political crackdown in the XUAR have heightened the risks faced by those who attempt to publicise such information unofficially, including by passing information about arrests and sentences to individuals and organizations in other countries. The imprisonment of Rebiya Kadeer, detailed above, has sent a message to other Uighur activists that even passing local newspaper reports to the outside world may be considered a criminal offence. A combination of all of these factors make it impossible to make an accurate assessment of the number of those arrested and detained for political reasons in the XUAR.
At the annual session of the 10th National People's Congress in Beijing in March 2003, Han Zhubin, China's then procurator-general, publicised statistics which revealed that in the five years between 1998-2002, procuratorates nationwide approved the arrest of 3,402 individuals and prosecuted 3,550 people on charges of "endangering state security".(24) This high figure seems to indicate an intensive effort by the Chinese authorities to crack down on any behaviour deemed to pose a threat to "state security" or the "socialist system", which would include purported acts of "terrorism" or "separatism". While these are national figures, it is likely that a significant number are cases of Uighurs detained and sentenced in the XUAR for "inciting separatism".
In March 2002, Amnesty International estimated that thousands of people had been detained in the XUAR during the six months following September 2001, with at least scores charged or sentenced under the Criminal Law - most of them Uighurs.(25) Given the intensification in the official crackdown on the "three evil forces" of "separatism, terrorism and religious extremism" in the region, it is likely that the numbers have increased significantly since then.
In September 2003, exile Uighur sources reported that tens of thousands of people had been detained as alleged "separatists" or "terrorists" since March 2002 in the context of security operations in various cities in the XUAR aimed at confiscating or burning Uighur books and other media believed to promote independence.(26) They also estimated that from April to August 2002, 5,000 people were detained in Kashgar alone during a security operation aimed at unofficial Islamic activities. Around 150 of these people were reportedly executed.(27) Amnesty International has been unable to verify these figures.
On 24 September 2003, the Chinese authorities publicly announced a renewed security crackdown in the region, which was due to last for 100 days from 1 October 2003 (National Day) to Chinese New Year in late January 2004. Amnesty International is concerned that this is likely to have led to a significant increase in the number of Uighurs detained and/or sentenced for alleged "separatist" or "terrorist" offences.
Combating "terrorism": China's propaganda war intensifies
Following the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, the Chinese authorities have actively sought to justify their crackdown in the XUAR as part of the international "war on terror" in an attempt to garner international support for their actions. Since then, the Chinese authorities have widely publicised the occurrence of a number of explosions and other violent activities attributed to armed Uighur nationalist groups during the 1980s and 1990s and used this as a pretext to justify the government's crackdown in the region in terms of "counter-terrorism".
Over the last three years, Uighur nationalists who would formerly have been branded as "separatists" have increasingly been labelled "terrorists". At the end of December 2001, China amended the provisions of its Criminal Law with the stated purpose of making more explicit the measures it already contained to punish "terrorist" crimes. In March 2002, Amnesty International published a report analysing these amendments and expressing concern that the new provisions enlarge the scope for application of the death penalty in China and could be used to further suppress freedom of expression and association.(28)
The crackdown on "separatists, terrorists and religious extremists" has continued over the last three years, even though there have been no official reports of attacks by "terrorist" groups. According to a Chinese government report published on 21 January 2002, which listed "terrorist" incidents in the region over the past ten years, the most recent explosion allegedly carried out by a "terrorist" group took place in April 1998 in Yecheng and the only other recent incident of violence imputed to "terrorists" since 1999 was the murder of one court official in Kashgar prefecture in February 2001.(29)
The absence of such incidents since then has recently been confirmed by local officials. On 12 April 2004, the Chair of the XUAR regional government, Ismael Tiliwaldi stated in a press conference that "not one incident of explosion or assassination took place in the last few years".(30) He added that "terrorists" had "incurred public wrath like a rat running across the streets."(31) In an apparent attempt to promote the economic potential of the region, he claimed that the public security situation in the region was "very good" and that "300,000 foreign tourists and more than ten million domestic tourists tour Xinjiang each year". "Not one of the 500 foreigners permanently residing in Xinjiang runs into trouble."
Nevertheless, in December 2002, China again highlighted the alleged threat posed by "East Turkestan terrorist forces" in a White Paper on National Defense, published by the State Council, which included a long section identifying "terrorism" as a key security issue. The paper reiterated that "China, too, is a victim of terrorism," and that "the 'East Turkistan terrorist forces' are a serious threat to the security of the lives and property of the people of all China's ethnic groups, as well as to the country's social stability."(32)
In apparent response to international criticism about its policies in the XUAR, in May 2003, China's State Council released a new White Paper entitled The History and Development of Xinjiang, which asserted that the rights of ethnic minorities in the region were fully protected, including freedom of religious belief.(33) The paper also stated that "[a]fter the September 11 incident, the voices calling for an international anti-terrorist struggle and cooperation have become louder and louder. In order to get out of their predicament, the 'East Turkestan' forces once again have raised the banner of 'human rights,' 'freedom of religion' and 'interests of ethnic minorities,' and fabricated claims that 'the Chinese government is using every opportunity to oppress ethnic minorities,' to mislead the public and deceive world opinion in order to escape blows dealt by the international struggle against terrorism." However, the paper failed to acknowledge or address concerns raised repeatedly by international human rights NGOs, United Nations experts and others about serious and widespread human rights violations against the Uighur community in the region over many years.
On 15 December 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security issued a list of "East Turkestan terrorists" and "terrorist organizations" abroad.(34) This named four organizations: the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the East Turkestan Information Centre (ETIC) and eleven individual members of these groups: Hasan Mahsum, Muhanmetemin Hazret, Dolkun Isa, Abdujelil Karakash, Abdukadir Yapuquan, Abdumijit Muhammatkelim, Abdula Kariaji, Ablimit Tursun, Huadaberdi Hasherbik, Yasin Muhammat and Atahan Abuduhani. At the time of publication, the Chinese authorities called on other states to take international action by tracking these people down and handing them over to China.
Commentaries also appeared in the official Chinese press detailing "terrorist" incidents allegedly carried out by the individuals listed. In keeping with previous patterns, this information was uncorroborated and no credible evidence was provided to substantiate these claims. Indeed, much of the "evidence" appeared to have been obtained from other individuals under interrogation. In view of the ongoing and widespread use of torture and ill-treatment by police in China, particularly to extract "confessions" from detained suspects, Amnesty International believes any "evidence" obtained in this way must be treated with deep suspicion.(35)
Two of the organizations, WUYC and ETIC, headed by Dolkun Isa and Abdujelil Karakash respectively, are legally constituted non-governmental organizations based in Germany which publicise reports of human rights abuses against Uighurs in China and advocate self-determination or independence for the region.(36) They have stated on numerous occasions that they are opposed to the use of violence.(37) Following the publication of the list, a spokesman for the German Ministry of the Interior reportedly stated that he was aware of the WUYC, but did not classify them as "extremist" and that he did not know anything about ETIC.(38) Amnesty International is concerned that China's inclusion of these groups in its list is an attempt to curb their peaceful political and human rights monitoring activities, and to conflate peaceful political activism with violent acts of "terrorism".
The listing of ETIM and ETLO was in keeping with previous allegations made by China against these groups. Both were highlighted in China's official report on "East Turkestan terrorists" of January 2002 and China's allegations against ETIM were bolstered in August 2002 when the US, closely followed by the UN(39), formally classified ETIM as a "terrorist organization" after repeated lobbying from China. The grounds that formed the basis for this decision, aside from China's previous allegations, remain unclear.
A report produced by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) in December 2001 had documented a number of armed groups allegedly operating in the region, but had failed to mention ETIM.(40) Its list of armed groups included: the United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan, the Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan, the Wolves of Lop Nor, the Xinjiang Liberation Organization, the Uighur Liberation Organization, the Home of East Turkestan Youth and the Free Turkestan Movement. China's official statement on "East Turkestan terrorists" published in January 2002 listed several groups allegedly responsible for violence, including ETIM, ETLO, the Islamic Reformist Party 'Shock Brigade', the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkestan International Committee.
Academics have noted the general lack of information available on any of the groups listed above and it remains unclear on what basis the US agreed to specifically single out ETIM as a "terrorist organization".(41) Since then, the US has refused to meet Chinese demands to formally add ETLO to its list. In a rare interview, conducted by Radio Free Asia on 24 January 2003, the secretive leader of this organization, Mehmet Emin Hazret reportedly stated: "[o]ur principle goal is to achieve independence for East Turkestan by peaceful means. But to show our enemies and friends our determination on the East Turkestan issue, we view a military wing as inevitable."(42) He reportedly denied allegations that ETLO had previously been involved in attacks and rejected links between his group and ETIM, which, he claimed, he had never heard of until it was listed in China's official report of January 2002.(43)
Official definitions of "terrorism"
In January 2003, a young poet was reportedly arrested after he recited a verse during a performance at a Kashgar concert hall.(44) A local Chinese Communist Party official reportedly clarified that his poem "attacked government policy regarding ethnic minorities" and that "he wanted to destroy the unity between Uighur and Han". He reportedly added that "we regard this as terrorism in the spiritual form, but we want to educate not punish him."(45) No further details about the poet or his fate have become available. Amnesty International is concerned that the vague term "spiritual terrorism" - not concretely prescribed, let alone defined, in China's criminal law - appears to have been used in this case as a pretext for arrest.(46)
Amnesty International has previously raised concerns about China's recent interpretation of the demonstration and ensuing unrest in Gulja in February 1997 as an act of "terrorism" instigated by ETIM(47), otherwise cited as the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah (ETIPA).(48) Independent eyewitness reports received by Amnesty International indicate that the incident was a demonstration by local people calling for equal rights for Uighurs which degenerated into violence and rioting after the security forces used excessive force in an attempt to forcibly disperse the protestors. According to some eyewitness accounts, several members of the security forces opened fire on the demonstrators leading to an unknown number of deaths and injuries. Hundreds of detained demonstrators were reportedly hosed down with icy water in the cold February weather, resulting in frostbite and, in some cases, amputations of fingers, hands or feet. In the following days, thousands of residents were detained when soldiers and riot police carried out systematic searches through the streets, arresting and beating people, including children, in the process. Thousands of people were detained, many of them were tortured and at least two people died in custody, apparently as a result of torture or ill-treatment.(49)
Official moves to link the Gulja protests with "terrorists" were reinforced most recently during the trial of Shaheer Ali, a Uighur nationalist from Khotan in the XUAR, who was convicted and executed as a "terrorist" and alleged leader of ETIPA in March 2003 after being forcibly returned from Nepal the previous year. (This case is described in more detail below.)
In February 2003, Amnesty International wrote to the chair of the XUAR regional government, Ismael Tiliwaldi, asking for details about those believed to remain in prison in connection with the Gulja incident, calling for an independent inquiry into allegations of human rights violations that took place at that time, and requesting further information to substantiate official claims of ETIM/ETIPA's involvement.(50) To date, Amnesty International has received no response to this letter.
Like several other provisions in the Chinese Criminal Law, "terrorism" and related offences remain vaguely defined giving the authorities wide leeway to interpret such crimes in a broad manner.(51) This is of particular concern given the 2001 amendments to the Criminal Law, detailed above, which increase penalties for so-called "terrorist" offences, including in some cases the application of the death penalty, a punishment which Amnesty International opposes under all circumstances as a violation of the right to life.
There is no internationally accepted legal definition of the terms "terrorism" or "terrorist"(52) and recent attempts by Chinese officials to define such terms at the national level are unconvincing. During the news conference, in which he introduced the list of alleged "terrorists" in December 2003, Zhao Yongchen, deputy director of the counter-terrorism department of the Ministry of Public Security gave the following criteria for 'defining' terrorist organizations:
· An organization or organizations that engage in terrorist activities endangering national security or social stability, and harm life and property through violence and terror (regardless of whether it is based in or outside of China);
· Possessing established organizational leadership and division of labour or systems for division of labour.
And in addition to the above two criteria:
· Currently or previously involved in the organization, planning, instigation, conduct or implementation of terrorist activities;
· Funding and supporting terrorist activities;
· Establishing bases for terrorist activities or organizing, recruiting and training terrorists;
· Collaborating with international terrorist organizations by receiving funding or training from these organizations or engaging in terrorist activities with them. He went on to define "terrorists" as:
· Those who have established links with terrorist organizations and who engage in terrorist activities which harm state security or the lives and property of people (whether they are Chinese or foreign citizens).
And in addition to this, they must:
· organise, lead or belong to a terrorist organization;
· organise, plan, instigate, propagate or incite the implementation of terrorist activities;
· fund and support terrorist organizations and terrorists to assist them in the conduct of terrorist activities;
· receive funding or training from the above-mentioned terrorist organizations or other international terrorist organizations to engage in terrorist activities.(53)
While this is a relatively detailed list of categories, it provides no concrete definition of the terms "terror", "terrorism" or "terrorist", potentially giving the authorities a free hand to interpret such crimes in a sweeping rather than a narrow sense.
Amnesty International recognizes the duty of states under international human rights law to protect their populations from violent criminal acts. However, such measures should be implemented within a framework of protection for all human rights. The presence in any community of some violent groups or individuals must not be used to as a pretext to curtail the fundamental human rights of the community as a whole. Indeed, experience across the world shows that such policies are likely to lead to further violence, as those who wish to express their grievances peacefully find that all channels for such expression are closed.
The plight of Uighurs abroad
International legal standards on the principle of non-refoulement
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment [...]. Article 7, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Article 3, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984 (hereafter, Convention against Torture)
No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Article 33, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 (hereafter, Refugee Convention).
The international legal principle of non-refoulement bars all states from returning individuals to a country where their lives or liberty are at risk or where they are likely to face torture. This is a binding principle of customary international law which is also laid out in international treaties such as the Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture. The right not to be subjected to refoulement has been elaborated further by UN human rights bodies, including the Committee against Torture (CAT) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitor States' compliance with the Convention against Torture and the ICCPR respectively.
The CAT has reiterated the absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and has taken the view that "Article 3 applies irrespective of whether the individual concerned has committed crimes and the seriousness of those crimes"(54) and that "the nature of the activities in which the person engaged is not a relevant consideration in the taking of a decision in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention"(55) In addition, the HRC has noted that "tates parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement".(56)
Statements made by the UN Special Rapporteur on torture (SRT) have added weight to the decisions taken by the CAT and HRC. In particular in his report in 2002, the SRT reiterated the link between the non-derogable nature of the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement when he stated:
"t is submitted that the principle contained in the Human Rights Committee's statement and the above provision of the Convention against Torture represents an inherent part of the overall fundamental obligation to avoid contributing in any way to a violation of the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It must be emphasized that the protection offered by the principle of non-refoulement is of an imperative nature. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur notes the findings of the Committee against Torture to the effect that "the nature of the activities in which the person engaged is not a relevant consideration in the taking of a decision in accordance with article 3 of the Convention" and that article 3 applies "irrespective of whether the individual concerned has committed crimes and the seriousness of those crimes".(57)
The fate of Uighur activists forcibly returned to China
Over recent years, Amnesty International has monitored growing numbers of forced returns of Uighur asylum seekers and refugees to China from several neighbouring countries, including Nepal, Pakistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Several Uighurs accused of committing criminal offences have also been forcibly returned, either clandestinely or under the terms of extradition agreements between China and other countries.
Such cases appear to have increased with the intensification of China's crackdown in the XUAR following the attacks in the USA of 11 September 2001, and in some cases there is evidence that the Chinese authorities have instigated or taken part in such returns. The fate of Uighurs returned to China is often difficult to establish due to tight restrictions on information, including the threat of reprisals against family members who pass such information abroad. However, in some recent cases, returnees are reported to have been subjected to serious human rights violations, including torture, unfair trial and even execution.
Amnesty International opposes the return of anyone to a country where they might face torture, execution or other serious human rights violations. The following are examples of countries where Uighurs are at particular risk of forcible return or where Uighurs are known to have been been forcibly returned to China over recent years, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001.
Nepal
Nepal has been party to the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture since 1991, but has not ratified the Refugee Convention. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) plays a key role in assessing asylum seeker applications in Nepal, including Uighur cases.
China's relations with Nepal have long been complicated by the presence of over 20,000 exile Tibetans in Nepal, many of whom have campaigned for religious freedom and independence for Tibet. During an official visit to China in July 2002, King Gyanendra of Nepal reportedly promised that his country would seek greater cooperation from China on the issue of Tibet and that he would not allow people inside Nepal to "agitate against China".(58) In return, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin reportedly offered "moral support" for the Nepalese authorities' struggle with "Maoist rebels" in Nepal.(59) Until recently, few Uighurs are known to have fled to Nepal from China. However, since 2000, at least 16 Uighurs are reported to have arrived in Nepal to seek asylum. Several cases of refoulement which have emerged over the last two years have shown that the country is not a safe country of asylum for Uighur exiles.
In one recent case, a Uighur activist, Shaheer Ali (also known as Shir Ali, Xieraili, Wujimaimaiti Abasi or Ghojamamat Abbas) was executed after being forcibly returned from Nepal to China. He had been recognised as a refugee by UNHCR in Nepal and was awaiting resettlement at the time of his detention and subsequent forcible return (refoulement).
Shaheer Ali was a young Uighur nationalist from the city of Khotan (Hetian) in the south of the XUAR. According to his testimony, which he requested be withheld until he was "in a safe place", he had been imprisoned and tortured in China in 1994 in connection with his political activities. He fled to Nepal via Tibet in November 2000 and applied for recognition as a refugee with UNHCR. He was recognised as a refugee in May 2001. In spite of this, he was detained by the Nepalese immigration authorities in December 2001 and held in Hanuman Dhoka district police office in Kathmandu for several weeks.
He is believed to have been taken away from the police office by a group of Nepalese police and officials from the Chinese embassy in Nepal on or around 10 January 2002 and forcibly returned to China shortly thereafter. One, possibly two, other Uighur detainees were taken away at the same time. One of them, Abdu Allah Sattar (also known as Abdullah Sattar), had been detained at the same time as Shaheer Ali and is also presumed to have been forcibly returned to China. Amnesty International has received no further information on his current whereabouts. The identity of the third possible returnee remains unclear.
Amnesty International received no further information on the fate of Shaheer Ali until October 2003, when it was reported in the official Chinese media that he had been executed. The exact date of Shaheer Ali's execution is unclear, but he was reportedly sentenced to death in March 2003 after being convicted of various offences including "separatism", "organizing and leading a terrorist organization" and "illegal manufacture, trading and possession of weapons and explosives". His sentence was confirmed on appeal by the Xinjiang High People's Court.
According to a report on the official Chinese website www.tianshan.net on 21 October 2003, the court accused Shaheer Ali of leading a number of "terrorist" organizations, including the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah (ETIPA).(60) The court claimed that he had instructed members of the group to carry out various bombings, assassinations and other activities. It also stated that he conspired and engaged in "large-scale incitement and propaganda to split the country" which culminated in the Gulja (Yining) incident of 5 February 1997, which was described as an incident of "beating, smashing and looting".(61)
Shaheer Ali was tried in secret and it is not known what evidence was presented in court to substantiate the accusations against him. According to interviews that Shaheer Ali gave to Radio Free Asia while he was in Nepal and which were made public after his death, he claimed to belong to a group called the East Turkestan Islamic Reform Party which he described as a 'non-militant' organization.(62) He also described eight months of torture while imprisoned in Guma (Pishan) county, XUAR, in 1994, including being beaten with shackles, shocked in an electric chair and having metal nails pushed under his toenails, in an attempt to make him confess to various offences.
The execution of Shaheer Ali led to renewed concern about the fate of Abdu Allah Sattar (mentioned above) and another Uighur, Kheyum Whashim Ali (also known as Washim Ali), who was forcibly returned from Nepal in mid-2002. Kheyum Whashim Ali was recognised as a refugee by UNHCR in Nepal in October 2001, but was arrested and detained by the Nepalese immigration authorities soon afterwards. He was transferred to Hanuman Dhoka district police office on 1 May 2002 apparently for "investigation", although the charges against him were unclear. He was reportedly taken to the office of the Chief District Officer in Kathmandu on 23 May 2003 before being taken away again to an unknown location. According to one eyewitness, Kheyum Whashim Ali was in tears as he was being taken away.
It is not known exactly when Kheyum Whashim Ali was forcibly returned to China, but in February 2003, Amnesty International received reports that he was detained in Michuan prison, around 40km outside Urumqi, the regional capital. Later reports from unofficial sources indicated that he was being held in isolation in a single cell; his face was swollen and he lacked mobility in his legs, allegedly as a result of torture or ill-treatment. Unconfirmed reports suggest that he has been charged with "subversion, separatism, involvement with an illegal organization and collecting money to buy weapons". To date, it remains unclear whether Kheyum Whashim Ali has been tried and sentenced. Amnesty International is seriously concerned for his safety.
Amnesty International considers that the obligation not to return an individual to a country where they face torture or other serious human rights violations should be fulfilled by the receiving country, in this case, Nepal. Nepal is not party to the Refugee Convention, but is nevertheless still bound by the principle of non-refoulement which is a fundamental principle of customary international law. China is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the apparent involvement of Chinese officials in these cases in the receiving country raises serious questions over China's commitment to uphold international law. One of the fundamental principles of international refugee protection is that the granting of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act and that, as such, it cannot be regarded as unfriendly by any other state.(63) China risks undermining this important principle and the whole international framework of refugee protection through actions that put undue pressure on states hosting Chinese asylum-seekers and refugees, asylum-seekers themselves and other Chinese nationals in exile.(64)
Concerns about China's involvement are heightened by another well-publicised incident in Nepal last year, involving the refoulement of 18 Tibetans, including three women and eight children, in a joint operation carried out by officials from Nepal and China.(65) Eyewitnesses described the Tibetans as being carried crying and screaming into a vehicle believed to be owned by the Chinese embassy before being driven in the direction of the border by Chinese and Nepalese officials. The operation was carried out on 31 May 2003 in the face of widespread international concern expressed by UNHCR, governments and NGOs. The 18 were detained upon arrival in Tibet. Some of those who were later released described being subjected to torture and ill-treatment in detention, including being kicked, beaten, prodded with electroshock batons, having sewing needles inserted under their fingernails, being forced to stand naked for long periods of time and being subjected to humiliating comments about their religious beliefs. Most were released a few months later, but at least one of them, believed to be the guide for the group, known as Tashi, was reportedly transferred to a prison in the Tibet capital, Lhasa. His current legal status and condition remain unclear, but he is believed to have received particularly harsh treatment because of his role as the guide.(66)
Pakistan
Pakistan is not party to the ICCPR, Convention against Torture or the Refugee Convention. It is nevertheless still bound by the principle of non-refoulement, which is a fundamental norm of customary international law. UNHCR plays an essential role in conducting refugee status determination in Pakistan, including on Uighur cases.
There are close trading links between the XUAR and Pakistan via the Karakorum highway and Pakistan has also reportedly been the source of numerous Islamic materials that have been smuggled into the XUAR in recent years.(67) Thousands of Uighurs are reported to have travelled backwards and forwards to Pakistan for business and religious purposes, particularly to study in Pakistan's madrassas. In addition, several camps used to train "terrorists" have reportedly been located in Pakistan, and some reports suggest that Uighurs have been among those trained in such camps.(68) China has also claimed that around 600 Uighurs escaped from Afghanistan to northern Pakistan in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan in 2001, but Amnesty International has been unable to verify this claim.
Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, China and Pakistan have sought to strengthen their cooperation in combating acts of "terrorism". In December 2003, it was reported that Pakistani troops had killed Hasan Mahsum, the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), in the South Waziristan region of Pakistan on 2 October 2003. It is unclear why this announcement was delayed, but the information was publicised just a few days after China published its official list of Uighur "terrorists" and "terrorist organizations" based abroad, which was headed by Hasan Mahsum's name (see below).
In March 2003, the two countries agreed to enter into an extradition treaty to facilitate the exchange of prisoners. The treaty was formally signed during a visit to Beijing by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in November 2003. According to the official Chinese media, President Musharraf stated during the visit that "his country will never allow anybody, including the terrorist force of 'East Turkestan', to use the territory of Pakistan to carry out any form of anti-China activities".(69) In January 2004, it was further reported that China had forwarded a list of Chinese "terrorists and outfits linked to al-Qaeda" to Pakistan, asking the authorities to initiate action against these groups.(70) Amnesty International has not seen a copy of this list, but is concerned that it may contain individuals who have engaged in peaceful political activism or independent religious practices, as well as those who may be involved in violent activities. In May 2004, a XUAR public security official, Ma Mingyue, was quoted in the Pakistani press as saying that some "terrorists" and ETIM members from Xinjiang were hiding in the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi.(71)
At least seven Uighurs are known to have been forcibly sent back to China from Pakistan since the beginning of 2002, some of whom had been recognised as refugees by UNHCR and were awaiting resettlement in other countries. The cases detailed below are those which Amnesty International has been able to document. However, it is feared that other Uighurs may also have been secretly returned from Pakistan in violation of their fundamental human rights and in violation of Pakistani domestic law on extradition.(72)
In May 2002, it was announced by Chinese officials at a news conference in Urumqi, that Ismail Kadir (or Ilham Kadir), alleged to be the "third highest leader" of ETIM, had been returned to China in March 2002 following his arrest in Pakistan earlier the same month.(73) Official reports suggested that he had been captured by Pakistani authorities in Kashmir. Overseas Uighur activists, however, claim that he was arrested in the city of Rawalpindi, northern Pakistan, home to a sizeable community of exile Uighurs.(74) They have also disputed official allegations that he was an ETIM member. Since his forcible return to China, no further information has become available about Ismail Kadir's place of detention or legal status. Given his alleged background, Amnesty International fears that he may have been subjected to torture, and possibly sentenced to death and executed, as is often the case with such prisoners.
On 2 February 2002, two Uighurs, Ismayil Abdusemed Haji (also known as Ilham), and Abdulhakim were arrested in Rawalpindi, and unconfirmed reports suggest that they were handed over to China immediately without any legal process.(75) Some reports indicate that Chinese officials in plain clothes accompanied Pakistani police at the time of their arrest. It is possible that Ismayil Abdusemed Haji may be a pseudonym for Ismael Kadir, mentioned above. Amnesty International has received no further information about the fate of the two men.
Elham Tohtam, Ablitip Abdul Kadir and Enver Tohti (or Enver Dawut) all went missing in Rawalpindi, northern Pakistan on or around 22 April 2002. All had reportedly applied to UNHCR for asylum and were awaiting the results of their applications. Elham Tohtam was picked up by the police at around 6.30am and, according to eye-witnesses, blind-folded and led away to an unknown destination. Elham Tohtam is originally from Gulja city in the XUAR and was detained and tortured there in 1996 and 1999 for his suspected political activities. In April 1999, fearing further persecution, he fled first to Kyrgyzstan, then Kazakstan. In November 2000 he went to Pakistan where he lived with his wife and four children in Rawalpindi. He had approached UNHCR in Islamabad and the Australian government for emergency visas to Australia, where he has family members. Both Ablitip Abdul Kadir and Enver Tohti are also from Gulja. Ablitip Abdul Kadir lived together with his wife and three of his children in Pakistan. Unofficial sources suggest that the three were detained upon their return to China, although the charges against them and other details about their imprisonment remain unknown.
Three other Uighurs from Gulja are reported to have been arrested in Rawalpindi at around the same time. Their names are Golamjan Yasin, Tilivaldi and Ablikim Turahun. One Uighur from Kazakstan, identified as Ezizhan, and one Kyrgyz from Gulja, identified as Zayir (or Zaher), are also reported to have been arrested. Their fate remains unknown.
More recently, on 16 July 2003, two Uighurs, Abdulwahab Tohti and Muhammed Tohti Metrozi went missing in Rawalpindi. Both were reportedly engaged in pro-independence activities in the XUAR before fleeing to Pakistan. Muhammed Tohti Metrozi had become a student leader in Pakistan and had already been recognised as a refugee by UNHCR in Pakistan. He was awaiting resettlement to Sweden.
They both "disappeared" after Muhammed Tohti Metrozi received a telephone call from an official who reportedly worked for the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau asking them to come for a meeting. They went to meet the official and unconfirmed reports suggest that the two were transferred to China around three days later. As of August 2003, they were reported to be detained in Urumqi.
Amnesty International recently received information from an unofficial source that Muhammed Tohti Metrozi was tried on or around 10 April 2004 in Urumqi. The accusations against him reportedly related to sheltering Uighur activists who fled from China to Pakistan, belonging to a "separatist" group and applying to UNHCR for asylum. Muhammed Tohti Metrozi reportedly rejected these accusations, but the outcome of the trial, his health condition, and his exact place of detention remain unknown. No further information is available about the fate of Abdulwahab Tohti.
Fears of the safety of those returned are heightened by an earlier case in Pakistan when, in 1997, a group of around 14 Uighur religious students were arrested in Gilgit close to the Chinese border and handed over to the Chinese authorities without any legal process. They were reportedly summarily executed on the Chinese side soon after being driven across the border.
Central Asia: Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan
The ICCPR has been ratified by Kyrgyzstan, and signed, but not ratified, by Kazakstan. Both states are parties to the Convention against Torture and the Refugee Convention. However, Kazakstan does not allow Uighurs access to the national asylum procedure, reportedly due to the delicate relationships between these countries and China. In Kyrgyzstan, Uighur asylum seekers can theoretically apply to a national procedure for protection, but do not do so, apparently for fear that the Kyrgyz authorities will pass this information on to the Chinese authorities. UNHCR therefore plays the key role in assessing refugee protection claims in these countries.
Their shared border with China and their large native Uighur populations make Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan the most common first countries of 'refuge' for Uighurs fleeing the XUAR. Yet, they are possibly the most unsafe countries of asylum for Uighurs. In the context of its policies in the XUAR, China has made great efforts to ensure that its Central Asian neighbours cooperate in returning Uighurs who are suspected of being "separatists, terrorists or religious extremists". This relationship has been strengthened in recent years under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which groups China, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Secretariat of the SCO was formally established in Beijing in January 2004 and a regional "anti-terror" centre was officially opened in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in June 2004. Largely spearheaded by China, the organization has been described as a "major force" in combating "terrorism" by Chinese officials(76) and one of its key aims appears to be to quell the activities of Uighur nationalists in both the XUAR and Central Asia. China also has extradition agreements with both Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.(77)
According to the official Chinese media, during a visit to the XUAR in May 2004, President Nazarbayev of Kazakstan said that 'Kazakstan will always adhere to the one-China policy and is willing to strengthen cooperation with China in the combat against terrorism, separatism and extremism for regional peace and stability'.(78) This, and other statements made by SCO members, suggest that China's neighbours appear to have adopted the China's concept of "separatism", which encompasses peaceful opposition activities, and are ready to cooperate with China to crack down on such activities. Amnesty International is concerned that such cooperation appears to be aimed at ensuring the forcible return of Uighurs to China, notwithstanding the high risks they face of serious human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary detention and even execution.
Both Kazakstan and Kyrygzstan are home to large Uighur communities, comprising Uighur nationals of these countries as well as those who have arrived from the XUAR more recently.(79) Local Uighur activists in both countries have expressed alarm at a recent series of media reports which purport to denigrate Uighurs as a whole, including by describing Uighurs generally as "separatists" or "terrorists". Activists in the region have suggested that such articles may be instigated by local "pro-China forces" and the Chinese security forces.(80)
Uighur asylum seekers in both Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan face an ever-present risk of being detained by the police as "illegal immigrants", which puts them in greater danger of being forcibly returned to China. One Uighur asylum seeker, who wished to remain anonymous, reported that the police had said "you are a separatist, you are a terrorist" when they arrested him recently in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. When he presented an official document stating that he was a person of concern to UNHCR, they reportedly replied: "this is like toilet paper - it won't help you." He was taken to a detention centre but released later the same day following intervention by UNHCR.
Local NGOs working with Uighur asylum seekers in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan have also reported growing numbers of